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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I wasn’t even thinking that day.  I just made a very immature and quick 
decision.  I didn’t even think twice about it.”2  Nineteen-year-old Brenda Valencia 
                                                                
1 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946). 
2Ed Bradley, More Than They Deserve, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/31 
/60minutes/main590900.shtml (Jan. 4, 2004) (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). 
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gave this response when asked why she agreed to give a ride to her roommate’s 
stepmother to pick up money from a cocaine dealer.3  As a result of her hasty 
decision, Valencia, who had never previously been in trouble with the law, received 
a 12 year, 7 month prison sentence for conspiracy to sell cocaine.4  At the sentencing 
hearing, the district court judge said, “This case is the perfect example of why . . . the 
sentencing guidelines are not only absurd, but an insult to justice.”5   
In another district court, Judge Gerard Lynch lamented the “Draconian remedy” 
he had to impose on an 18-year-old college freshman, and he described the case as 
“the worst of [his] judicial career.”6  Pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(Guidelines), Judge Lynch sentenced Jorge Pabon-Cruz (Pabon) to the mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years in federal prison for use of the Internet in advertising 
to receive and distribute child pornography.7  Pabon had no criminal history and no 
evidence indicated that he created the images or had any contact with the children in 
the images.8  Judge Lynch noted the astounding fact that if Pabon had been convicted 
of having sex with a 12-year-old, he would likely have received only five years in 
prison.9  At sentencing, Judge Lynch explained that he had “some difficulty 
imagining that ten years in prison is going to do either [Pabon] or society much 
good.”10
The landmark case of United States v. Booker 11 transformed the Guidelines from 
a binding and mandatory determinate sentencing system to one that is now advisory 
in nature.   So long as the Guidelines remain advisory, district court judges may 
exercise a greater degree of judicial discretion and avoid assigning unduly harsh 
sentences, such as the ones imposed on Brenda Valencia and Jorge Pabon-Cruz.  
Judges and juries have welcomed Booker because the mandatory Guidelines often 
restricted their roles in criminal proceedings.12  Judges were forced to impose 
preordained sentences that limited their ability to consider the special circumstances 
surrounding each defendant’s case, as illustrated by the unsettling situation Judge 
Lynch faced when sentencing Jorge Pabon-Cruz.13  When the Guidelines did allow 
for increased judicial discretion in sentencing, it was often at the expense of the role 
                                                                
3Id. 
4Id. 
5American College of Trial Lawyers, United States Sentencing Guidelines 2004: An 
Experiment That Has Failed 32 (2004), available at  http://www.actl.com/pdfs/Sentencing 
Guidelines_3.pdf [hereinafter Trial Lawyers] (quoting Bradley, supra note 2).  
6Benjamin Weiser, A Judge’s Struggle to Avoid Imposing a Penalty He Hated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at A1 (quoting United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F. Supp. 2d 200 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
7See id.   
8See id. 
9See id. 
10See id. 
11125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
12Trial Lawyers, supra note 5, at 2. 
13Id.  
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of the jury.14  Fortunately, recent case law has begun to clarify the constitutional role 
of the judge and jury in sentencing and in doing so has paved the way for meaningful 
federal sentencing reform.   
This Note examines the inherent conflict among the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, judicial discretion, and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by 
jury.15  Part two of this Note will provide a historical overview of the Guidelines.  
Part three will discuss the application of the Guidelines and the role of juries and 
judges at sentencing hearings.  Part four will highlight criticisms relating to how the 
Guidelines often usurp power from juries and judges.  Part five will examine the 
milestone cases of Blakely v. Washington,16 United States v. Booker,17 and United 
States v. Fanfan18 (hereinafter “Booker” refers to the combined cases of defendants 
Booker and Fanfan).  These cases illustrate the constitutional problem created by 
mandatory determinate sentencing schemes.  Although the Guidelines currently 
function in an advisory capacity, it remains unknown what the future holds for 
determinate sentencing in the federal system.   
Part six of this Note will consider reform proposals Congress may adopt to 
remedy the Sixth Amendment violation caused by application of mandatory 
Guidelines.  This section evaluates the Bowman proposal, the Kansas System, and 
advisory Guidelines.  Congress should resist the temptation to respond immediately 
to Booker.  Instead, Congress should permit the advisory Guidelines to remain in 
place.  Only advisory Guidelines will provide the time needed to collect post-Booker 
sentencing data that will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of our current system, 
especially when compared to our previous system.  This data will enable Congress to 
develop a viable sentencing scheme that embraces the role of the jury while also 
allowing for greater judicial discretion, which in turn will advance individualized 
justice.  Finally, part seven urges Congress not to race towards legislative 
amendments.  Congress must deliberate to arrive at forward-thinking sentencing 
reform addressing not only constitutional issues, but policy concerns as well. 
II.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Prior to the implementation of the Guidelines, federal judges enjoyed great 
leeway in sentencing defendants.19  Pursuant to a discretionary “medical” model of 
sentencing, judges tailored sentences in light of defendants’ prospects of 
                                                                
14Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 108th 
Cong. (2004) (testimony of Rachel Barkow, Assistant Professor of Law, New York University 
School of Law), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260&wit_id=3684 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Barkow Speech].  I found Professor Barkow’s work to 
be an invaluable source throughout my work on this note.  She has conducted thorough 
research on the history of the jury in America, and I recommend her writing to anyone 
examining sentencing policy and the Sixth Amendment.    
15U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
16124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
17125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
18125 S. Ct. 12 (2004). 
19CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
526.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2004). 
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rehabilitation.20  Interestingly, however, judges did not have to state their legal 
reasons for the sentences they imposed and appellate review of sentences usually did 
not occur as long as sentences did not exceed the statutory maximum for the 
offense(s) committed.21  In effect, federal judges rarely had “to justify or explain the 
substantive law and procedural rules [that] shaped sentences.”22  As a result, extreme 
disparities in judicial sentencing of similarly situated offenders became a routine 
occurrence.23  
A.  The Reform Movement Emerges 
Throughout the 1970s, members of the legal community started to criticize 
unfettered judicial discretion and a sentencing reform movement emerged.24  Reform 
advocates believed that unwarranted sentence disparities among similar offenders 
stemmed from two sources: (1) judges who possessed unlimited discretion in 
assigning sentences and (2) parole officials who wielded power to determine actual 
prison release dates.25  Judge Marvin Frankel emerged as a leader of the sentencing 
reform movement.26  He pushed for the development of a code of penal law.27  His 
vision for a revised federal system consisted of a sentencing commission with the job 
of crafting a uniform sentencing scheme.28  The scheme proposed by Frankel took 
into account the severity of the offense committed, an offender’s criminal history, 
and various mitigating and aggravating factors.29     
In response to Judge Frankel and other campaigners who called for reform to a 
system allowing for capricious sentences in district courts across the country, 
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.30  The Act established the 
United States Sentencing Commission, an independent agency within the judicial 
branch, and assigned to the Commission the task of devising a determinate 
                                                                
20Douglas Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Vol. 19, No. 4, 
Winter 2005, at 5.  
21Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced For A “Crime” the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. 
United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather 
Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS. 249, 252 (1998).  
22Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The 
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (1999) 
[hereinafter Berman, Common Law]. 
23Id.  
24Mark T. Bailey, Note, Feeney’s Folly: Why Appellate Courts Should Review Departures 
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference, 90 IOWA L. REV. 269, 275 (2004). 
25Id. at 276. 
26Id. 
27Berman, Common Law, supra note 22, at 95.  
28Bailey, supra note 24, at 277; see also Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
29Bailey, supra note 24, at 278. 
30U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.1, cmt. 1. (2004). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss4/7
2005-06] BOOKER AND OUR BRAVE NEW WORLD 661 
sentencing scheme to be implemented in all federal courts.31  The Commission 
completed its undertaking, and by late 1987 the Guidelines took effect.32  They 
functioned as a modified version of “real offense sentencing,” a system in which 
punishment reflects the actual conduct in which a defendant engaged, and thus 
allows a judge to increase penalties based on acquitted and uncharged conduct.33
B.  Laudable Goals—The Sentencing Reform Act 
The policy statement for the Sentencing Reform Act identified three primary 
goals for sentencing:  honesty, uniformity, and proportionality.34  Honesty refers to 
the elimination of a sentencing system in which defendants serve significantly less 
prison time than the penalty imposed.  Under the previous indeterminate system, 
because of “good time” credit reductions and the role of the parole commission in 
determining the remainder of a prisoner’s sentence, a federal inmate typically served 
only one-third of the original sentence imposed by the sentencing judge.35  In 
response to this issue, the Commission abandoned parole and instead adopted a 
“truth-in-sentencing” policy mandating that offenders serve at least 85% of their 
sentence.36  “Truth-in-sentencing” promotes honesty by eliminating the uncertainty 
surrounding how much time a defendant will actually serve.        
The goals of uniformity and proportionality must be viewed together.  
Uniformity seeks to narrow the disparity in sentences imposed by different federal 
judges for similar crimes by similar offenders.37  Unguided sentencing resulted in 
notable sentencing disparities.  Studies have confirmed that race often affected 
sentencing such that an African-American offender often received a longer sentence 
than a white offender who committed the same offense.38  In contrast to uniformity, 
proportionality pursues more individualized justice by imposing different sentences 
for crimes of varying degrees of severity.39  Together, honesty, uniformity, and 
proportionality aim to deter crime and to provide just criminal sentences.              
Today, the Commission claims to have met its goals.40  Enactment of the 
Guidelines by district court judges, however, has resulted in a significant increase in 
the length of federal sentences, a shift away from probation in favor of incarceration, 
                                                                
31Id. 
32Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1211, 1212 (2004). 
33Letter from John Sands, Federal Public Defender, to United States Sentencing 
Commission (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Sands Letter], available at 16 FED. SENT. R. 361 
(2004).  
34U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.1, cmt. 3. (2004). 
35Id. 
36See The Sentencing Project, New Incarceration Figures: Growth in Population 
Continues, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
37Id. 
38Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377 (2005). 
39U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.1, cmt. 3. (2004). 
40Miller, supra note 32, at 1218. 
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and a dramatic rise in the size of the federal prison population.41  When the 
Guidelines took effect, experts predicted that over the first ten years of 
implementation, the Guidelines would cause a 10% increase in the federal prison 
population.42  In fact, the population of inmates in federal prisons doubled between 
1987 and 1997.43  The Commission’s 15-year study of federal sentencing, released in 
November 2004, revealed that the typical federal felon sentenced in 1984 spent 
approximately 25 months in prison, while the average defendant sentenced in 2002 
will spend nearly 50 months incarcerated.44  In 2008, the federal government is 
expected to spend $4.6 billion on inmates who serve 87% of their sentences.45  Even 
if inmates serve only half of their sentences, the government is still expected to 
spend at least $2.9 billion.46  These statistics clearly exhibit how punishment under 
the Guidelines has grown increasingly severe.  One commentator has aptly noted, 
“This system loves punishment.”47   
III.  APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES  
A.  How the Guidelines Operate 
A basic understanding of how the Guidelines function is required in order to 
understand how the Guidelines infringe upon the role of the judge and the jury in 
criminal sentencing and why mandatory Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment.  
In applying the Guidelines to determine a defendant’s punishment, a judge must 
impose a sentence that falls somewhere within a prescribed Guideline range.48  To 
arrive at the appropriate Guideline range, a judge engages in several levels of 
analysis.  First, a judge must determine the defendant’s total offense level and 
criminal history. 49  A total offense level takes into account two factors: (1) the “base 
offense level,” which is determined by “relevant conduct,” and (2) the “specific 
offense characteristics.”50  “Relevant conduct” includes all acts “that occurred during 
. . . in preparation for . . . or in the course of attempting to avoid detection” for the 
                                                                
41Id. at 1212.  
42WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19. 
43Id.  The United States Sentencing Commission recently published a fifteen-year study on 
federal sentencing.  The report included the following statistics, which reflect data collected 
through 2002: the use of imprisonment for federal offenders reached 86%, the use of simple 
probation was one-third of what it had been in 1987, and federal offenders sentenced in 2002 
will spend nearly twice as long in prison as offenders sentenced in 1984. U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING (2004). 
44U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING (2004).   
45The Sentencing Project, Truth-in-Sentencing in the Federal Prison System, at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/tis-federal.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
46Id. 
47Miller, supra note 32, at 1212.   
48U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.1, cmt. 2. (2004). 
49Trial Lawyers, supra note 5, at 12. 
50Chanenson, supra note 38, at 398.  
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offense, even if the conduct was uncharged or charged and acquitted.51  Next, a judge 
considers relevant departure factors such as behavior of the victim or offender, and 
he applies any dictated adjustments to the total offense level and criminal history.52  
The final step in arriving at a Guidelines sentence requires a judge to plot values on 
the Sentencing Grid.53  One axis consists of 43 offense levels, and 6 categories of 
criminal history comprise the other axis.54  The intersection of the offense level and 
criminal history on the Sentencing Grid determines the Guideline range.  Although 
plugging numbers into a grid may appear relatively straight-forward, application of 
the Guidelines is exceedingly complex, as indicated by the fact that the manual for 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines spans over 500 pages.55
B.  The Importance of a Label 
With respect to the proper role of the judge and jury in the application of the 
Guidelines, the central issue relates to the classification of facts as either “offense 
elements” or “sentencing factors.”56  Labeling facts as “offense elements” elicits 
certain procedural protections: namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, inclusion 
in the indictment, and trial by jury.57  Unlike “offense elements,” “sentencing 
factors” do not receive strict procedural protection even though they affect the 
severity of punishment.58  The prosecution must prove “sentencing factors” by only a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Judge Nancy Gertner explained that  
once a fact is safely in the sentencing category, as opposed to the trial 
category . . . no matter what its impact on the sentence, that fact is 
litigated with the lowest burden of proof, the preponderance standard . . . 
and the court may even consider counts on which the jury acquitted the 
defendant.59   
The label attached to a fact in a criminal hearing retains tremendous importance 
because it determines not only the burden of proof, but also whether the judge or jury 
addresses the fact.         
                                                                
51Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(b).  
52Bailey, supra note 24, at 277-78. 
53Id. at 278. 
54Id.   
55Id.   
56Nancy King and Susan Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1469 (2001).  
57Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (holding that the 
government must prove all elements beyond a reasonably doubt); Hamling v. United States, 
418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (holding that all elements must be included in the indictment); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the government must prove all 
elements to the jury)). 
58Id. 
59Judge Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED. SENT. R. 83, *2 (2002).    
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C.  “Elements” v. “Factors” Case Law 
Case law relating to sentencing procedure and the distinctions between “offense 
elements” and “sentencing factors” has been unfolding unpredictably in recent years.  
At no point in time has the Supreme Court clearly identified how to determine 
whether facts are “offense elements” or whether particular facts comprise 
“sentencing factors.”  For example, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,60 the 
Court deemed recidivism a “sentencing factor” rather than an “element” of an 
aggravated offense, and thus held that recidivism may be determined by a judge and 
used to increase a defendant’s sentence.61  Yet one year later, in Jones v. United 
States,62 the Court interpreted a federal carjacking statute so as to avoid judicial 
determination of a “sentencing factor” that would increase a defendant’s 
punishment.63  The Court interpreted the statute to contain three separate offenses, 
each carrying separate penalties depending on the extent of the harm to the victim.64  
As such, the Court held that serious bodily injury to the victim is an aggravating 
factor that creates a separate carjacking offense, and thus, it must be charged in an 
indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.65  These two cases 
demonstrate the Court’s vacillation when it must apply labels to facts.  Over the 
years, precedent relating to sentencing procedure has failed to provide 
comprehensive guidance on how to decide upon labels and what to do with facts 
after labels have been attached.       
Not until the seminal case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, did the Court finally 
extend Sixth Amendment protections to “sentencing factors.”66  In Apprendi, the trial 
judge found that the defendant acted “with purpose to intimidate an individual . . . 
because of race.”67  As a result of this finding, the judge applied a New Jersey statute 
increasing jail sentences for hate-crimes.68  The application of the statute more than 
doubled the defendant’s sentence.69  After commenting on the “novel and elusive 
distinction between ‘elements’ and ‘sentencing factors,’” the Court stated that “the 
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose 
                                                                
60Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
61Id.  The Court did not outline the requisite standard of proof that a judge must apply 
when engaging in factfinding. 
62Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
63Id.  
64Id. at 229, 243-44.  
65Id. at 251 (“[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty 
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). 
66530 U.S. 466 (2000).  In this case, defendant Charles Apprendi fired shots into the home 
of an African-American family.  Id.  At trial Apprendi pled guilty to various weapons 
offenses, which carried a ten-year maximum sentence.  Id.  Recidivism is the one sentencing 
factor that does not receive Sixth Amendment protections. Almendarez, 523 U.S. at 224.  
67Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
68Id. at 471. 
69Id. 
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the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty 
verdict?”70  The Court noted that sentence enhancements have the potential to 
become “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.”71  
Consequently, the Court held that aside from a prior conviction, “any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and prove[n] beyond a reasonable doubt.”72  Apprendi 
announced a new principle in federal sentencing. 
In the pivotal case of Ring v. Arizona,73 the Court extended the reasoning from  
Apprendi to capital sentencing.  Overruling precedent, the majority held that because 
statutory aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty 
operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth 
Amendment mandates that they be found by a jury.74  Both Apprendi and Ring paved 
the way for the holding in United States v. Booker, which has incited a new wave of 
discussion relating to federal sentencing reform.     
A remarkable anomaly in this line of cases examining application of the 
Guidelines is Harris v. United States.75  Decided on the same day as Ring, Harris 
explained that Apprendi did not invalidate mandatory minimum sentencing where a 
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, a sentencing factor triggering a 
minimum sentence.76  According to the Court, Apprendi only applied to facts 
increasing the statutory maximum.77  Facts found by a judge may determine the 
bottom-end of a presumptive sentencing range.78  Thus, in a plurality opinion, the 
Court held that factors increasing the mandatory minimum sentence “need not be 
alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”79  Defense attorneys throughout the country stoutly criticize Harris and urge 
the Court to overturn the decision.80       
The line between “offense elements” and “sentencing factors” is not always 
predictable.  Ambiguities still exist, and the exceptions set forth in Almendarez-
Torres and Harris remain good law.  Despite these inconsistencies, Jones, Apprendi, 
                                                                
70Id. at 494.  
71Id.     
72Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
73536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
74Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 and overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 
U.S. 639 (1990) (holding that statutory aggravating factors could be found by a judge without 
violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial)). 
75536 U.S. 545 (2002). 
76Id. at 557.  In this case, the judge found that Harris had brandished a firearm while 
selling illegal narcotics.  Id. 
77Id. at 567. 
78Id. at 565. 
79Id.  
80Testimony of Jon Sands to United States Sentencing Commission (Nov. 16, 2004), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/Sands.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).  
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and Ring make clear one leading principle about sentencing:  when considering 
sentence enhancements, the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant.               
IV.  CRITICISMS OF THE GUIDELINES 
“The Guidelines have made few friends in their two decades of existence.”81  
Ever since the Guidelines took effect, legal literature has been replete with 
criticisms.  Some critics accuse the Guidelines of “micro-managing” judges.82  
Others find the system overly rigid.83  In an August 2, 2003 speech, Justice Kennedy 
lamented that “our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences 
too long.”84  This examination focuses on the how the Guidelines usurp power from 
both the jury and the judge at sentencing. 
A.  The Jury 
Whether the Guidelines infringe upon the role of the jury is important for several 
reasons.  First, the Constitution codifies the jury’s power.  Article III states that “the 
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury,”85 and the Sixth Amendment guarantees “the 
right to . . . an impartial jury.”86  At the Constitutional Convention, without debate, 
Federalists and Antifederalists agreed upon a criminal defendant’s right to a jury 
trial.87  Moreover, the framers of the Constitution regarded a criminal jury as more 
than a mere “utilitarian fact-finding body.”88  Although a jury’s primary function is 
to act as a fact finder and to apply law to facts through the issuance of verdicts, a jury 
also instills the community’s morals into criminal proceedings.89  A jury helps to 
                                                                
81Rachel Barkow, The Devil You Know: Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. 
R. 312, 312 (2004). 
82Id.  
83Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (testimony of Mr. Ronald Weich, partner in the law firm of Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260&wit_id=3685 (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2005). 
84The Sentencing Project’s Comments and Recommendations Submitted to the Justice 
Kennedy Commission of the American Bar Association, Nov. 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/tsp-kennedy.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
85U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  
86U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
87Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era 
of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 54 (2003).  In Federalist No. 83 Alexander 
Hamilton wrote that “the friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in 
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury.” The Federalist No. 83, 
at 499 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
88Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 87, at 55 (quoting Kristen K. Sauer, Note, 
Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1249 (1995)).  
89Id. at 35-36, 59. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss4/7
2005-06] BOOKER AND OUR BRAVE NEW WORLD 667 
ensure that a defendant is not convicted if it would be in gross opposition to the 
community’s sense of justice and blameworthiness.90  Overall, the jury system 
provides a cornerstone in our justice system, and it illustrates our nation’s regard for 
community values.91
The Guidelines affront the role of the jury at sentencing by shifting the jury’s 
responsibilities to the judge.92  In terms of “sentencing factors,” the Guidelines allow 
district court judges to engage in fact-finding that frequently results in increased 
sentences for defendants.93  Furthermore, as a modified “real offense system,” the 
Guidelines require judges to consider facts not included in the jury’s conviction.94  In 
effect, a “real offense system” has the potential to transform a jury’s acquittal of 
particular counts into a meaningless exercise.95  For these reasons, sentencing reform 
must occur.        
B.  The Judge 
In addition to impeding the function of the jury, the Guidelines hamper judicial 
discretion.  One law professor explained that “the formal structure and strict 
language of specific guideline provisions led judges to complain that the Guidelines 
converted them into ‘rubber-stamp bureaucrats’ and ‘judicial accountants’ in the 
sentencing process.”96  Prior to Booker, the Guidelines constrained a district court 
judge when the case before the judge consisted of facts and circumstances 
considered by the United States Sentencing Commission in developing the 
Guidelines.97  The Guidelines prohibited a judge from departing from a dictated 
sentencing range due to considerations such as race, sex, national origin, creed, and 
religion.98  Only in exceptional cases could a judge consider “not ordinarily relevant” 
                                                                
90Id.  
91Barkow Speech, supra note 14. 
92Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 87, at 90. 
93Id. 
94Id. at 92. 
95Id. at 93.  Professor Barkow provides an illustrative example from United States v. 
Manor, 936 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir. 1991).  In this case, the prosecution charged the defendant 
with one count of conspiracy to distribute 250 grams of cocaine and with other counts 
involving the distribution of 19 grams of cocaine.  Id.  The jury acquitted the defendant of the 
conspiracy charge and convicted him of intent to distribute the 19 grams.  Id.  However, the 
judge at sentencing regarded the conspiracy count as relevant conduct, which significantly 
increased the defendant’s sentence.  Id.  Ultimately, the defendant faced the same sentence he 
would have faced if he had been convicted of the conspiracy count.  Id. 
96Berman, Common Law, supra note 22, at 101. 
97Trial Lawyers, supra note 5, at 9-10.  A district court judge may depart from the 
Guidelines’ prescribed sentence range only when “the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind of to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result 
in a sentence different from that described.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 
(2002). 
98U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.10, 5H1.12.  
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factors relating to the defendant’s non-criminal life.99  These factors include age, 
educational and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, history of 
substance abuse, employment record, family or community ties, socioeconomic 
status, and lack of guidance as a youth.100  Because a judge could consider facts such 
as those listed above in only limited circumstances, the person on trial became 
obscured by a web of Guideline provisions.  Judges had to set aside their discretion 
and mechanically calculate sentences on a grid.  
In 2003, Congress further limited judicial discretion in sentencing by passage of 
the Feeney Amendment, which restricts judges’ downward departure power.101  
Pursuant to the Feeney Amendment, district court judges must justify their departure 
decisions in written statements,102 and appellate courts must engage in de novo 
review of departures.103  Naturally, district court judges have responded to the 
Amendment by regarding it as an unwarranted seizure of their ebbing discretion.104
On the whole, the Guidelines limit judges’ ability to rely on their experience.  
While uniformity and proportionality are certainly desirable, pursuit of those goals 
should not exclude individualized justice.  Professor Steven Chanenson eloquently 
stated “sentencing systems should have a normative goal of striving for equilibrium 
between uniformity and individualization in such a way that is likely to yield a fair 
and just result.  Judges need the ability to genuinely consider ‘all ethically relevant 
differences between cases.’”105  Unlike Congress and the United States Sentencing 
Commission, district court judges interact with the defendant and therefore have a 
greater understanding of the human realities of sentencing.106  Judges are situated to 
“bring humanity to the project of sentencing,”107 and mandatory binding Guidelines 
intrude upon judges’ capacity to do so.        
                                                                
99Id.  §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6, 5H1.10, 5H1.12. 
100Id.  
101The Feeney Amendment is contained in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools 
Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act).  Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 
Stat. 650 (2003).  The Feeney Amendment is located at 117 Stat. 667.  
102“The court . . . shall state . . . the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence 
different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written 
order of judgment.” 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2); see also Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the 
Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely: A Former Commissioner’s 
Perspective, 2004 BYU L. REV. 935, 950 (2004). 
10318 U.S.C.A. 3742(e) (LexisNexis 2003); see also Goldsmith, supra note 102, at 950. 
104Goldsmith, supra note 102, at 950 (“[F]ederal judges understandably viewed it as a 
frontal assault on the limited sentencing discretion they retained under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.”). 
105Chanenson, supra note 38, at 386 (quoting MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 195 
(1996)). 
106Berman, Common Law, supra note 20, at 110. 
107Id. 
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V.  WHERE WE ARE TODAY 
Throughout the past 12 months, federal sentencing has undergone meticulous 
scrutiny.  Some scholars have contemplated a complete restructuring of the system’s 
design.108  The sharp rise in interest in federal sentencing is attributable to two 
leading cases:  Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker. 
A.  Blakely v. Washington109
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington regarding the state of 
Washington’s sentencing guidelines confirmed fears that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines affront the Sixth Amendment.  Blakely illustrates the tension among 
determinate sentencing systems, judicial discretion, and a defendant’s right to a trial 
by jury.  At his trial, defendant Ralph Blakely, Jr. pled guilty to kidnapping.110  The 
facts admitted in his plea warranted a 53-month sentence.111  However, the trial judge 
felt that Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” and so the judge imposed a 90-
month sentence, nearly three years beyond the prescribed penalty range.112  In a 5-4 
majority decision, the Court held that Blakely’s exceptional sentence113 violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury because the facts supporting the exceptional 
sentence were neither admitted by Blakely, nor found by a jury.114   
Blakely has received extensive attention because it provided an impetus for 
reform of the federal sentencing system.115  Some rightly suggested that Blakely 
signaled the end of the federal government’s twenty-year experiment with mandatory 
determinate sentencing.116  Judge Nancy Gertner commented that while  
Blakely has gone a long way to make the sentencing system more fair and 
to reinvigorate the role of the juries in the process, it is inconceivable that 
the system now required by the decision is at all consistent with anything 
contemplated by the drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act . . . or the 
Guidelines.117
                                                                
108See, e.g., Mark Osler, The 3X Solution, 16 FED. SENT. R. 344 (2004); Frank Bowman, 
Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into 
Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT. R 364, 365-66 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bowman Memo]. 
109124 S. Ct. 2431. 
110Id. at 2534. 
111Id. 
112Id.  
113An exceptional sentence is analogous to an upward departure in the federal system.  
Chanenson, supra note 38, at 404. 
114Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.  
115Douglas Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT. R. 89, 93 (2004).   
116Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).     
117United States v. Muffleman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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 Following Blakely, the legal community around the country entered into extensive 
dialogue examining whether the decision would impact the Guidelines.  As 
academics began to predict that the Blakely decision would apply to the Guidelines, 
118 nationwide commentary about restructuring the Guidelines quickly emerged.     
B.  United States v. Booker119
The Court’s opinion in Booker settled the vigorous debate about whether the 
Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely applies to the Guidelines. The Court 
answered in the affirmative.120  In Booker, respondent Freddie J. Booker faced a 
charge of possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base.121  At 
trial, the jury found Booker guilty of possessing 92.5 grams of cocaine.122  Based on 
the jury’s finding and Booker’s criminal history, the Guidelines dictated a maximum 
sentence of 262 months in prison.123  At sentencing, however, the judge found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams of 
cocaine and that he had obstructed justice by lying during his trial testimony.124  The 
judge’s findings resulted in a sentence of 360 months.125  On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit overturned the sentence, stating that it conflicted with Apprendi.126
Ducan Fanfan’s case raised the same constitutional issue regarding the 
Guidelines as Booker’s, and so the Court combined the two cases.  A grand jury in 
Maine charged Fanfan with conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine, a 
crime that carries a penalty of five to six years in prison.127  During sentencing, the 
judge made additional findings that required an enhanced sentence of fifteen to 
sixteen years.128  Despite his findings, in the aftermath of Blakely, the judge 
determined that he could not enhance Fanfan’s sentence based solely on judicially 
found facts. 129   To avoid potential constitutional problems, the judge imposed a 
sentence that did not implicate the Sixth Amendment.130  After denial of its motion to 
                                                                
118Professors Frank Bowman, Albert Alschuler, and Rachel Barkow were some of the 
leading academics to predict that Blakely would apply to the Guidelines.   
119125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).  
120Id.  
121Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
122Id.  
123Id. 
124Id. 
125Id. 
126Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746 (opinion of Stevens, J.).  
127Id. at 747.  
128Id.  
129Id. 
130Id. 
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amend Fanfan’s sentence, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
before the Supreme Court and the Court granted the petition.131   
The first issue the Court addressed in Booker was whether imposition of an 
enhanced sentence under the Guidelines based on the judicially found facts violates 
the Sixth Amendment.  To begin its analysis, the Court examined whether Blakely 
applies to the Guidelines.  Even though Blakely involved the Washington Sentencing 
Reform Act, Washington’s sentencing guidelines and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines are indistinguishable for Sixth Amendment purposes.132  In Booker, the 
government attempted to distinguish between the two systems by arguing that the 
“statutory maximum” for the state of Washington stemmed from Title 18 of the 
United States Code, while the “statutory maximum” for purposes of the Guidelines 
was dictated by rules created by the United States Sentencing Commission.133  This 
argument failed for several reasons, all of which elevate substance over form.  Both 
Washington’s system and the Guidelines (prior to Booker) are mandatory sentencing 
schemes that impose binding requirements on all sentencing judges.134  The fact that 
the Guidelines are administratively promulgated is immaterial.135  In practice, 
Washington’s sentencing system and the Guidelines serve the same purpose and do 
so in the same manner.  They authorize judges to enact sentence enhancements based 
on facts neither admitted by the defendant, nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.136  Both schemes begin with a “base offense level” and “criminal history,” and 
then they allow for sentence departures based on judicial fact-finding.137  The 
systems permit a judge to impose a sentence above that dictated by the “base offense 
level” and the defendant’s criminal history by finding facts proven only by a 
preponderance of the evidence.138  All of these similarities led to the conclusion that 
the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Blakely, applies to the Guidelines. 
In further examining the constitutionality of sentence enhancements based on 
judicial fact-finding, the Court articulated the following rationale.  To begin, the 
Court reiterated its position in Apprendi:  any fact, other than a prior conviction, that 
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by a plea of 
guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.139  Whenever a judge assigns a sentence that takes into account 
facts beyond those reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, the 
                                                                
131United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004). 
132Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 755 (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549 
(O’Connor, J. dissenting).  
133Reply Brief for Petitioner United States, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).  
134Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
135Id. at 752. 
136Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Council of Defense Lawyers in Support of 
Respondents, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Nos. 04-104 & 04-105), 2004 
WL 2097157. 
137Id. at *12. 
138Id. 
139Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748 (opinion of Stevens, J.).  
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Sixth Amendment is implicated.140  This proposition applies regardless of whether 
the facts relevant to the sentence are labeled as “sentencing factors” or as “elements” 
of the crime.141  Thus, the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment to the extent that 
they provide for judicial fact-finding of sentence-enhancing facts. 142
Because the Court concluded that the Guidelines unconstitutionally permit a 
judge to find sentence-enhancing facts, the second issue in Booker contemplated a 
remedy for the violation.  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority on this question, 
reasoned that when faced with the choice, Congress would have preferred severing 
the portions of the Sentencing Reform Act necessary to bring it into conformity with 
the Sixth Amendment rather than invalidating the Act as a whole.143  Therefore, the 
Court excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), mandating that judges impose sentences 
within the applicable Guidelines range, and § 3742(e), which contained cross-
references.144  Severance of these provisions of the Act renders the Guidelines 
advisory.145  A district court judge must “consult the Guidelines and take them into 
account when sentencing,” but may modify the sentence to address the unique 
circumstances of the case.146  By making the Guidelines advisory, the Court removed 
the Act from the reach of the Apprendi jury requirement.147   
In addition to transforming the Guidelines into advisory law, excision of the cited 
statutory provisions also altered the standard of review for sentencing appeals.  
Instead of engaging in de novo review, appellate courts will now review sentences 
for reasonableness.148  Reasonableness will be determined with reference to the 
remaining factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).149  According to the Court, 
“‘[r]easonableness standards are not foreign to sentencing law.  The Act has long 
required their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of 
departures and on review of sentences imposed where there was no applicable 
                                                                
140Id. at 749.  
141Id. at 748.   
142Id. at 756. 
143Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759 (opinion of Breyer, J.).  
144Id. at 756.  § 3742(e) sets forth the standards of review for appeals, including de novo 
review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2005). 
145Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757. 
146Id. at 767. 
147Id. at 764.   
148Id. at 765. 
149Id. at 766; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2005).  The Act still requires judges to 
consider sentencing goals, pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims of the 
offense.  Id.  Furthermore, in determining a sentence, the court must consider the need for the 
sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense; the need for the sentence imposed to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; the need for the sentence imposed to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant; and the need for the sentence imposed to provide 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training.  Id. at 765. 
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Guideline.”150  Because of these two examples, the Court claims judicial familiarity 
with the reasonableness standard of review.151  Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia 
fears that review for reasonableness “will produce a discordant symphony of 
different standards, varying from court to court and judge to judge.”152  Only time 
will tell how the newly imposed standard of review for sentence enhancements under 
the Guidelines will function in appellate courts across the country.     
C.  Responses to Booker 
Responses to the outcome of Booker have been abundant and wide-ranging.  
Criminal defense attorneys agree that Booker in no way creates a windfall for 
criminal defendants.153  Although judges may no longer enhance sentences based on 
their own fact-finding, Booker retains the Guidelines method of evaluating facts not 
in evidence and proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.  It remains to be 
seen whether the ruling will ameliorate the harshness of federal sentencing.154   
Amidst the clamor following the release of the opinion, Carmen Hernandez, vice 
president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, said “I don’t 
think the prison cells are going to be empty after today.”155  Attorney Rosemary 
Scapicchio, counsel for Ducan Fanfan, fears that defendants who appear before 
sympathetic judges may fare better, while those in front of harsh judges may face 
sentences more severe than the Guidelines dictate.156  Scapicchio told the press, “I 
think we’ve won the battle, [but] who wins the war remains to be seen.”157  Jon 
Sands, chairman of the Federal Defender Guideline Committee, best captured 
defense attorneys’ sentiments when he called the opinion “bittersweet” because “the 
Sixth Amendment was vindicated, but then it was undercut again, all in one day.”158
                                                                
150Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766.  (citations omitted).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (e)(3)(1994 ed.); 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4), (b)(4), (e)(4) (Supp. 2004). 
151Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766.   
152Id. at 795 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
153See, e.g., Shelley Murphy, Two Boston Jurists Hail Return of Discretion, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan 13, 2005, at A20 (statement of Rosemary Scapicchio) ("I think we've won the 
battle, and whoever wins the war reamins to be seen.");  Jeff Zent, Ruling Has F-M Law Field 
Buzzing, THE FORUM OF FARGO, Jan 15, 2005 (statement of Drew Wrigley) ("Felons shouldn't 
expect shorter sentences because of the ruling.  Nor will prisoners systematically get their 
sentences reduced on appeal."). 
154Cindy Culp & Tommy Witherspoon, Area Well Poised in Wake of Supreme Court 
Sentencing Decision, WACO-TRIBUNE HERALD, Jan.12, 2005, at A1. 
155Luiza Savage, Chaos Ahead After Sentencing Guidelines Decision, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 13, 
2005, at 1.  The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) is a 
professional bar association with over 11,000 direct members and considerably more affiliate 
members.  This national organization is the leading voice in furthering the goals of criminal 
defense lawyers.  The NACDL filed amicus curiae briefs in Blakely and Booker.     
156Charlie Savage, High Court Overturns Sentencing Guidelines, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 
2005, at A1. 
157Murphy, supra note 153.   
158Telephone Interview by Mary Price, Families Against Mandatory Minimum, with Jon 
Sands (Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with author). 
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Naturally, prosecutors have responded differently to the Booker outcome.  
Christopher Wray, Assistant Attorney General, explained that government officials 
were pleased that the Court did not strike down the Guidelines, but also disappointed 
that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory and binding on district court judges.159  
Now that the Guidelines have been deemed advisory, concern has spread that 
sentences across the country will become inconsistent and unpredictable.160  Because 
the Department of Justice believes that the Guidelines produce fair and uniform 
sentences, it has urged federal prosecutors to “take all steps necessary to ensure 
adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines.”161  In a recent policy memorandum, James 
Comey, Deputy Attorney General, instructed prosecutors to do the following: to 
continue to charge and pursue the most serious readily provable offenses, to seek 
sentences pursuant to the Guidelines in all but the most extreme cases, to oppose all 
sentences below the Guidelines range, and to adhere closely to the reporting 
requirements set forth in the United States Attorney’s Manual relating to unfavorable 
decisions.162  In the aftermath of Booker, the Department of Justice is fighting to 
preserve adherence to the Guidelines.           
Judges have generally embraced Booker because they are no longer constrained 
by the Guidelines, and they may impose sentences they believe to be more fitting.  
Although judges must continue to calculate sentences pursuant to the Guidelines and 
comply with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), judges have gained 
considerable discretion because they may decide whether to impose Guidelines 
sentences or modified penalties.163  Following Booker, a district court judge praised 
the fact that “the ruling gives judges the discretion to sentence the individual and not 
just the crime.”164  Judge Nancy Gertner explained that she welcomes the decision 
because “so many times [she] found [her]self in a situation where the Guideline 
sentence made no sense in light of the facts.”165  Booker allows federal judges to 
                                                                
159Stephen Henderson, Supreme Court Says Judges Not Bound by Sentencing Guidelines, 
KNIGHT RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, Jan. 13, 2005. 
160Id. 
161Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to all federal prosecutors, 
Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing, Jan. 28, 2005 [hereinafter 
Memorandum from James Comey].  Interestingly, in its Booker briefs, the DOJ endorsed 
advisory Guidelines in the event that the Court found Blakely applicable to the federal system.  
Reply Brief for the United States, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Nos. 04-104 
& 04-105), 2004 WL 1732451 at *9.  
162Memorandum from James Comey, supra note 161.  In order to aid prosecutors in 
adhering to reporting requirements, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys has 
distributed a form entitled “Booker Sentencing Report Form,” which replaces the “Blakely 
Sentencing Report Form” but not the “Standard Form for Reporting Adverse District Court 
Sentencing Guidelines Decisions.”  
163Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
164Henry Weinstein & David Rosenzweig, How Judges Will Use Discretion Is the Big 
Question, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A24 (citing Judge Dickran Tevrizian). 
165Murphy, supra note 153.   
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escape the straightjacket created by the Guidelines.  What has yet to be determined is 
how these same judges will exercise their regained sentencing discretion.166  
VI.  PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF THE GUIDELINES 
While the Guidelines currently function in an advisory capacity, observers expect 
Congress to enact legislation reverting the Guidelines back into a mandatory system, 
but one that honors the mandates of the Sixth Amendment.  For this reason Booker 
has reinvigorated discussions about meaningful sentencing reform.  A sense of 
opportunity pervades the criminal justice forum.  Barry Scheck, president of the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, remarked that “[t]his 
opportunity must not be squandered.  Congress must not react with a ‘quick fix’ and 
miss a chance to solve a lingering and serious national problem.”167  Instead, 
Congress must engage in extensive deliberation about the merits of various proposals 
to amend the Guidelines.  One cannot help being reminded of the sentencing reform 
movement that emerged in the 1970s as the Guidelines took shape.168  Once again, 
our criminal justice system finds itself on the brink of something new.   
A. The Bowman Proposal 
1.  Description 
The Bowman proposal, which is supported by the Department of Justice, is one 
of the leading proposals harmonizing the Guidelines with Booker. 169  This proposal 
                                                                
166Extreme views have emerged on how much weight to give to advisory Guidelines.  At 
one end of the spectrum is the view espoused by Utah District Court Judge Paul Cassell who 
treats the Guidelines as essentially mandatory.  Just days after Booker Judge Cassell issued an 
opinion in which he stated “the Guidelines are the only standard available to all judges around 
the country today.  For that reason alone the Guidelines should be followed in all but the most 
exceptional cases. . . . [T]he court [should] give heavy weight to the recommended    
Guidelines sentence in determining what sentence is appropriate.” United State v. Wilson 350 
F. Supp. 2d 910, (D. Utah 2005).  Clearly, this position discourages judges from exercising                   
their discretion and instead promotes mechanical adherence to the Guidelines.   
         At the other end of the spectrum lies Wisconsin District Court Judge Lynn Adelman, 
who regards the Guidelines as far more advisory.  Judge Adelman agrees that judges must 
seriously consider the Guidelines, but she believes that “courts are free to disagree, in 
individual cases and in the exercise of discretion, with the actual range proposed by the 
Guidelines, so long as the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully supported by reasons 
tied to the [28 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Ranum, 2005 353 F. Supp. 2d. 984 
(E.D. Wis. 2005).  Unlike Judge Cassell, Judge Adelman urges judges to consider all the 
unique circumstances surrounding particular defendants, and thus to sentence defendants as 
individuals. 
167Jerry Seper, High Court Voids “Mandatory” Sentencing, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, 
at A01.  
168See, e.g., Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
169Bowman Memo, supra note 108; see also Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. (2004) (testimony of Frank Bowman) [hereinafter Bowman Speech], available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260&wit_id=647 (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
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has been named after its creator, Professor Frank Bowman.170  The Bowman proposal 
preserves the basic structure of the Guidelines, but raises the top of each Guideline 
range to the statutory maximum set forth in the federal criminal code for the crime(s) 
of conviction.171  As a consequence of raising the sentencing ranges, a judge may 
make post-conviction findings of fact without having to involve the jury since the 
findings will not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum.172  In effect, 
this plan transforms the Guidelines into a system of mandatory minimum 
sentences.173  The Guidelines will operate just as they previously did, except that the 
sentencing range created by the Guidelines will retain the same minimum value, 
while the range maximum will mirror the statutory maximum.174  The primary appeal 
of this plan lies with the fact that it does not require significant alterations to existing 
pleading requirements or trial procedures.175  It brings the Guidelines into accord 
with Blakely without significantly changing their structure.  Interestingly, both the 
attractiveness and the weakness of the Bowman proposal relates to the fact that it 
leaves the Guidelines virtually unchanged.   
2. Why Congress Should Reject this Plan 
Without question, the Bowman proposal resolves constitutional concerns about 
the role of the jury in the application of the Guidelines; nonetheless, the plan remains 
undesirable and Congress should not adopt it as a long-term legislative solution.  The 
Bowman proposal creates a loophole that allows for the exclusion of the jury.176  
Shrewd legislative design enables this plan to evade the mandates of the Sixth 
                                                                
170Professor Bowman is M. Dale Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law.  
He is a former prosecutor, and worked as a trial attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice 
(1979-82).  Professor Bowman also served as Special Counsel to the United States Sentencing 
Commission (1995-96).  On February 10, 2005 Professor Bowman testified before the 
Subcommitee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary.  
Ironically, at the hearing he repudiated his own reform proposal.  He said:  
Today, in the wake of Booker, I find myself in the curious position of recommending 
that Congress not do what I recommended that it should do after Blakely.  In short . . . 
I urge Congress to be cautious, to monitory the effects of the Booker decision on the 
operation of federal sentencing, and not to legislate unless and until it is clear that 
legislation is absolutely necessary. 
Testimony of Frank Bowman to Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 10, 2005) 
[hereinafter Bowman Subcommittee on Crime Testimony], available at http://judiciary.house 
.gov/media/pdfs/Bowman021005.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
171Bowman Memo, supra note 108. 
172Id. 
173Frank Bowman, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System be Saved?, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 262 (2004). 
174Bowman Subcommittee on Crime Testimony, supra note 170. 
175Bowman Speech, supra note 169.  One modification of the plan would necessitate, 
however, is an amendment to the “25% Rule.”  See infra note 183.    
176Barkow Speech, supra note 14. 
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Amendment.177  Under the Bowman proposal, a judge can bypass the jury because no 
matter how much he increases a defendant’s sentence, the penalty will not exceed the 
statutory maximum.178  In Apprendi, the Court clearly explained that “it is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is 
exposed.”179  Because Congress has the duty to uphold and honor the Constitution,180 
Congress cannot legitimately adopt the Bowman proposal—to do so would repudiate 
Booker and the Sixth Amendment.  
The fact that the Bowman proposal creates unduly broad sentencing ranges 
further undermines its ability to provide effective sentencing reform.181  Raising the 
top of each sentencing range to the maximum penalty set forth in the United States 
Code will produce sentence ranges that exceed twenty years in some instances.182  
Creation of broad sentencing ranges ignores the purpose of the 25% Rule, which 
narrowed sentencing ranges because people regarded existing ranges as excessively 
broad and as a factor contributing to sentencing disparity.183  Furthermore, while 
broad sentencing ranges theoretically permit judges to exercise greater discretion in 
sentencing, this argument lacks merit because judicial discretion will remain fettered 
by mandatory minimum sentences.184  Unresolved tension among the Bowman 
proposal’s wide sentencing ranges, the 25% Rule, and appropriate judicial discretion 
indicates the need for a more workable determinate sentencing scheme.185              
                                                                
177Id.; see also Letter from E.E. Edwards, President, and Barry Scheck, President-Elect, 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, to Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick 
Leahy (July, 12, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter NACDL Letter]. 
178Barkow Speech, supra note 14. 
179Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). 
180U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 3.  
181Michael Goldsmith, Remarks Before the United States Sentencing Commission 1 (Nov. 
16, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/goldsmith.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2005). 
182Id.   
183The 25% Rule states that the maximum sentence for each range cannot exceed the 
minimum sentence by more than six months or 25%, whichever is greater. 28 U.S.C. § 
994(b)(2) (2004).  This rule resulted in the creation of forty-three offense levels on the federal 
Sentencing Table.   
184Barkow Speech, supra note 14. 
185Report on Advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines,  Jan. 2005 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CRIM. 
JUST. at 8, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/my05301.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
Report].  The American Bar Association recognizes the tension to which I alluded.  As a 
remedial measure, the ABA has urged Congress to repeal the 25% Rule. Id. at 1. In its place, 
the ABA recommends an altered sentencing table consisting of ten offense levels instead of 
forty-three.  The levels are as follows: 1.) 0 - 1 year, 2.) 1 - 2 years, 3.) 2 - 3 years, 4.) 3 - 4.5 
years, 5.) 4.5 - 6.75 years, 7.) 10 - 15 years, 8.) 15 - 22.5 years, 9.) 22.5 - 30 years, 10.) 30 
years – life. Id. at 11. 
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Another reason why Congress must refuse to enact the Bowman proposal relates 
to the precarious fate of Harris v. United States.186  The viability of the Bowman 
proposal depends on Harris remaining good law, which is questionable.  Only by a 
plurality did Harris uphold mandatory minimum sentences against Apprendi 
challenges.  Justice Breyer concurred in the Harris judgment simply because he 
disagreed with the majority in Apprendi and could not accept its rule.187  Now that 
the Court has applied Apprendi and Blakely to the Guidelines, the logic of Harris has 
grown suspect and the possibility lingers that Justice Breyer may change his vote if 
faced with a mandatory minimum issue again.188  As long as speculation surrounds 
the future of Harris, Congress should not implement a legislative plan that has the 
potential to become unconstitutional.        
Lastly, Congress must not adopt the Bowman proposal because it embodies an 
unbalanced approach to sentencing.  The Bowman proposal lacks symmetry insofar 
as it allows for discretionary upward departures without providing for similar 
downward departures.189  Guidelines restrictions will continue to control mitigating 
departures, but no similar restrictions will regulate aggravating departures.190  In 
effect, the Bowman proposal shifts the balance of a system designed to operate as a 
unified whole.  According to Utah District Court Judge Paul Cassell, the Guidelines 
are a “holistic system, calibrated to produce a fair sentence by a series of both 
upward and downward adjustments.”191  Judge Cassell warns that federal sentences 
will grow increasingly severe if Congress enacts a sentencing plan that considers 
“only one half of the equation.”192  The American Bar Association criticizes the 
Bowman plan for implicitly sending the message to the legal community that so long 
                                                                
186Letter from Susan Klein, Professor of Law, to United States Sentencing Commission 
(Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with author), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/ 
11_16_04/klein.pdf; see Testimony of Carmen Hernandez, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers, to the United States Sentencing Commission 7 (Nov. 16, 2004), available at  
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/hernandez.pdf [hereinafter Hernandez Testimony];  
Barkow Speech, supra note 14. 
187Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.  545, 569.  In Harris, Justice Breyer stated as follows: 
I cannot easily distinguish Apprendi v. New Jersey from this case in terms of logic.  
For that reason, I cannot agree with the plurality’s opinion insofar as it finds such a 
distinction.  At the same time, I continue to believe that the Sixth Amendment permits 
judges to apply sentencing factors—whether those factors lead to a sentence beyond 
the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the application of a mandatory minimum 
(as here).  And because I believe that extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums 
would have adverse practical, as well as legal, consequences, I cannot yet accept its 
rule. 
Id. (Breyer, J. concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).  
188ABA Report, supra note 185, at 8. 
189Sands Letter, supra note 33. 
190See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0; see also Chanenson, supra 
note 38, at 422 
191United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d. 1230, 1245 (C.D. Utah 2004)(quoted in 
Barkow Speech, supra note 14). 
192Id. 
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as criminal punishments do not become too lenient, no cause for concern exists.193  
Ultimately, raising the top of each sentencing range constitutes an asymmetric 
exploitation of the Guidelines and this manifest misuse brands the Bowman proposal 
highly objectionable. 
Extensive examination of the Bowman proposal reveals its unattractiveness as a 
legislative response to amend the Guidelines.  Congress must refrain from adopting 
this plan for sentencing reform.  The Bowman proposal eludes the directives of the 
Sixth Amendment and does little to address policy-based sentencing concerns.  
Regrettably, the Bowman proposal adopts a backdoor approach to Booker-based 
sentencing reform and does little more than employ clever language to manipulate 
the Guidelines.                        
B. The Kansas System 
1.  Description 
Another leading plan to harmonize the Guidelines with Booker is the Kansas 
System.  This proposal has been named the “Kansas System” in reference to the 
system currently used in Kansas.194  The Kansas System, widely supported by the 
defense bar,195 provides for bifurcated sentencing.  Bifurcated sentencing consists of 
an initial hearing to determine guilt, followed by a second hearing to decide on the 
existence of sentencing factors triggering a sentence beyond the range ordered by the 
Guidelines.196  A jury must find all facts essential to the sentence beyond a 
reasonable doubt.197   
The Kansas System emerged following State v. Gould,198 a case in which the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that the state’s determinate sentencing scheme for 
upward departures violated the Sixth Amendment.199  After Gould, the state 
legislature codified the language of Apprendi so that the pertinent Kansas sentencing 
statute reads as follows:  “Any fact that would increase the penalty for a crime 
beyond the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, shall be submitted to a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”200  Pursuant to the statute, to seek an 
                                                                
193 ABA Report, supra note 181, at 8-9. 
194See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716 (Supp. 2003).  
195See, e.g., Sands Letter, supra note 33.  In his majority opinion in Blakely, Justice Scalia 
mentioned the Kansas System as a plausible option for federal sentencing.  Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 
at 2541. 
196Steven G. Kalar et al., A Blakely Primer: An End to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines?, 28 CHAMPION 10, 14 (2004).  
197KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b) (Supp. 2003). 
198State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001). 
199Id. at 814.  In this case, defendant Crystal Gould was convicted of three counts of child 
abuse, each count subject to a sentence of between 31 and 34 months.  Id.  The prosecution 
filed a motion for an upward departure, and the court granted the motion, citing the existence 
of three aggravating factors.  Id.  As a result of these factors, Gould received a sentence of 68 
months for two of the three counts.  Id. 
200KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b) (Supp. 2003). 
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upward sentence departure, the state must file a motion thirty days prior to the start 
of the trial.201  The trial court may permit a jury to decide on the existence of 
aggravating factors during the guilt phase or during a separate sentencing hearing.202  
Only if the jury unanimously finds the existence of aggravating factors may the trial 
judge impose an enhanced sentence.203  Clearly, the Kansas System solves the Sixth 
Amendment violation created by the pre-Booker Guidelines.   
2.  Unpersuasive Criticisms 
The most common criticism of the Kansas System relates to the administrative 
burdens created by bifurcation.204  This argument remains unpersuasive because 
federal cases tend to involve only a limited number of enhancements.205  For 
example, a typical drug offense sentence pursuant to United States Sentencing 
Guidelines §2D1.1 does not involve findings other than the quantity of drugs 
implicated.206  Weapon possession is the second most common enhancement factor, 
and this issue arises in only 13% of drug cases.207  In terms of the various Chapter 
Three enhancements, application notes serve as an illustrative source for model jury 
instructions.208  Furthermore, these enhancements occur in only a limited number of 
cases.209  “Aggravating role,” the most common Chapter Three enhancement, arises 
in only 5.6% of all cases.  According to the Sentencing Commission’s 2002 
Sourcebook, other Chapter Three enhancements take place in a mere 1% of cases.210  
These statistics plainly indicate that enhancements that may implicate bifurcation do 
not occur with great frequency; thus, it appears unlikely that bifurcated sentencing 
will inundate and slow the federal criminal justice system.                  
The language of Blakely further discounts efficiency criticisms.  Blakely clearly 
asserts that administrative concerns relating to the length and complexity of trials 
                                                                
201KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). 
202KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b)(2), (3) (Supp. 2003). 
203KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b)(7) (Supp. 2003). 
204See, e.g., Testimony of Stephanos Bibas to United States Sentencing Commission 7-8 
(Nov. 16, 2004) (describing bifurcation as “cumbersome and very expensive”), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/Bibas.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).   
205Hernandez Testimony, supra note 186, at 5.   
206Id. at 6 (citing United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal 
Sentencing Statistics (2002)). 
207Id. 
208 Sands Letter, supra note 31.  The following list includes the frequency of other Chapter 
Three enhancements: Vulnerable Victim — 0.4%, Official Victim — 0.3%, Terrorism — 
<0.1%, Abuse of Position of Trust — 2.2%, Obstruction of Justice — 3.4%, Hate Crime —  
<0.1%, Restraint of Victim — 0.2%, Use of a Minor — 0.8%, Reckless Endangerment — 
0.3%.  UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/SBTOC02.htm..   
209UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS (2002). 
210Id.; see also Sands Letter, supra note 33; Hernandez Testimony, supra note 186, at 6. 
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may not infringe upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.211  Justice Scalia 
emphasized that “decision[s] cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury 
impairs the efficiency . . . of criminal justice.”212  A defendant’s jury trial rights 
cannot be sacrificed to achieve “administrative perfection.” 213        
Opponents of the Kansas System also claim that the complexity of the Guidelines 
renders them incompatible with bifurcation.  This argument fails for two reasons.  
First, bifurcation already takes place in arguably some of the most difficult criminal 
cases—capital cases.214  Under the Federal Death Penalty Act, capital juries must 
determine the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors before deciding if the 
aggravating factors “sufficiently outweigh” the mitigating factors so as to “justify a 
sentence of death.”215  A second point belying the amenability argument comes from 
the Department of Justice’s charging policies after Blakely.216  In a July 2, 2004 
memorandum to federal prosecutors, Deputy Attorney General James Comey 
instructed prosecutors “to include in indictments all readily provable Guidelines 
upward adjustments and upward departure factors.”217  This directive makes clear the 
ability of prosecutors to adapt to bifurcated sentencing proceedings.  The Guidelines 
and bifurcation can be successfully intermingled.                   
3.  Why Congress Should Reject This Plan 
Despite the fact that efficiency and complexity-based criticisms of the Kansas 
System are not compelling, several reasons lend support the proposition that 
Congress should not adopt the proposal.  A principal failing of the Kansas System is 
its tendency to distort the sentencing process as a whole.  By codifying the 
formalistic requirement that a jury find all facts related to an enhanced sentence, the 
Kansas System removes the judge from sentencing.218  Only a jury may engage in 
fact-finding, and after a jury finds facts, a judge is constrained to sentence within the 
range provided by the Guidelines.219  In effect, the Kansas System would transform 
the federal system into jury sentencing, as opposed to judicial sentencing.  Moreover, 
the plan skews the Guidelines by limiting a judge’s ability to depart in the presence 
or absence of facts found by a jury.220  The ability for a judge to depart from the 
Guidelines is critical in light of the Sentencing Commission’s inability to take into 
                                                                
211Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543. 
212Id.  
213Id. 
214NACDL Letter, supra note 177. 
21518 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c)-(e) (West Supp. 2005).   
216NACDL Letter, supra note 177.    
217Letter from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors (July 2, 
2004), 16 FED. SENT. R. 357 (2004).  
218Telephone Interview by Mary Price, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, with 
Frank Bowman, Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at Ohio State Univ. (Jan. 12, 2005) 
(on file with author). 
219Id. 
220Chanenson, supra note 38, at 422. 
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account every possible factor relevant to criminal sentencing.221  Judges must be able 
to depart in order to implement individualized justice when appropriate.  Lastly, the 
Kansas System alters the balance of Guidelines sentencing by placing restrictions on 
upward departures, but not on downward departures.222  When judges may exercise 
only a narrow degree of discretion, unwarranted sentencing leniency or severity 
becomes a very real possibility and individualized justice may be sacrificed.223     
Another basis for opposition to the Kansas System relates to the uncomplicated 
manner by which judges can bypass juries to impose longer sentences.  The primary 
appeal of the Kansas System—that a judge may only impose an enhanced sentence 
based on jury findings—is undermined by the fact that current procedural rules 
permit judges to impose longer sentences simply by ordering sentences to run 
consecutively as opposed to concurrently.224  A consecutive sentence is the 
functional equivalent of an enhanced sentence because in either situation the 
defendant faces a longer punishment.  By imposing a consecutive sentence on a 
defendant convicted of multiple counts, a trial judge can circumvent the jury and 
bifurcation.225  Besides manipulating the system to exclude the jury, the practice of 
enhancing sentences by imposing consecutive sentences is undesirable because it 
shields a sentence from appellate review since the sentence will technically lie within 
the Guidelines range.226
Admittedly, judges could engage in such a practice prior to Apprendi; yet, the 
heightened administrative requirements of the Kansas System create greater 
temptation to do so.  Courts have not been inclined to reprimand judges for 
bypassing juries, as demonstrated by State v. Bramlett.227  In Bramlett, the Kansas 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial judge improperly avoided 
Apprendi-based jury fact-finding by imposing consecutive sentences.228  Thus far, 
courts have chosen form over function, a fact that should deter Congress from 
adopting the Kansas System.        
On the whole, the Kansas System distorts Guidelines sentencing and fails to 
establish a proper degree of judicial discretion.  Judge Paul Cassell’s statement again 
comes to mind: the Guidelines function as a “holistic system, calibrated to produce a 
                                                                
221Id. 
222Id. at 423. 
223Once a jury has found certain facts and essentially approved an enhanced sentence, 
Professor Chanenson noted “it is asking a great deal of any judge . . . to exercise her discretion 
and deny that departure.  No doubt judges denied these kinds of upward departures regularly 
under the previous system despite the existence of judicially found facts, but in that system, 
the judge was in control of the entire process.” This observation supports to the claim that 
sentences may grow increasingly severe under the Kansas System.  Chanenson, supra note 38, 
at 425. 
224Chanenson, supra note 38, at 428. 
225Id. 
226Id. at 429. 
22741 P.3d 796 (Kan. 2002) (cited by Chanenson, supra note 38, at 428). 
228Bramlett, 41 P.3d at 797. 
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fair sentence by a series of both upward and downward adjustments.”229  The 
distortion created by the Kansas System permits too much judicial discretion in some 
instances and too little in others.  Bifurcation creates additional administrative 
requirements while also lending itself to manipulation by the various actors involved.  
In his remedial opinion in Booker, Justice Breyer chose not to adopt bifurcation,230 
and Congress must as well.     
C.  Advisory Guidelines 
“Crafting a measured and appropriate response to Blakely [and Booker] calls for 
studied deliberation, not hasty action.”231  The Guidelines have been functioning in 
an advisory capacity for only a brief period of time.232  Despite predictions of 
tremendous disruption and turmoil in the event that the Court found the Guidelines to 
violate the Constitution,233 the federal system has been carefully adapting to the new 
sentencing landscape created by Booker.  Most certainly, judges have struggled to 
interpret and apply Booker at this watershed moment in criminal law, but predictions 
of insurmountable upheaval have largely proved superfluous.  For this reason, 
Congress must refrain from taking premature legislative action.       
1.  The Need to Collect Data 
The most appropriate congressional response to Booker is an investigation of the 
efficacy of advisory Guidelines.  Booker created “a workable system whose strengths 
and weaknesses have yet to be determined.”234  Although application of Booker is 
rapidly unfolding in district courts around the country, the exact implications of the 
case have yet to be determined.235  For example, judges have demonstrated various 
interpretations of just how “advisory” the Guidelines are.236  Furthermore, precisely 
because Booker casts a shadow on 20 years of calculated sentencing reform, 
Congress must avoid rushing to enact new legislation.  Congress must ensure that 
whatever plan it adopts, the system will survive constitutional challenge.237  The 
American Bar Association recommends that Congress not reject advisory Guidelines 
until it appears essential and advantageous to do so.238  At this point in time, it 
                                                                
229Croxford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156, at *10. 
230Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759-64 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
231Go Slow: A Recommendation for Responding to Blakely v. Washington in the Federal 
System, 108th Cong., at 2 (2004) (written testimony of Douglas Berman, Marc Miller, Nora 
Demleitner, and Ronald Wright) (on file with author). 
232The Guidelines became advisory on January 12, 2005, the day the Court released 
Booker. 
233See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).  In his remedial dissent 
in Booker, Justice Scalia referred to the majority’s remedy as a “Wonderland.”  Booker, 125 S. 
Ct. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
234Bowman Subcommittee on Crime Testimony, supra note 170. 
235Id. 
236See supra text accompanying note 166. 
237Id. 
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remains unknown whether advisory Guidelines will produce results contrary to the 
goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, including unwarranted sentencing 
disparity.  Therefore, until advisory Guidelines show signs of potentially 
jeopardizing the objectives of the Act, swift legislative action need not occur.      
Mechanisms exist to assist Congress in the collection of reliable sentencing data 
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of advisory Guidelines.  To begin, the Booker 
remedial majority emphasized the continuing role of the United States Sentencing 
Commission.239  A day after the release of Booker, Commission Chair Judge Ricardo 
Hinojosa issued a statement acknowledging the call of Booker and noting that “the 
Commission will work with Congress, members of the federal judiciary’s Committee 
on Criminal Law, the Department of Justice, the defense bar . . . and other interested 
individuals to ensure that we have a fair and just sentencing system within the 
bounds of our Constitution.”240  The Commission is properly situated to develop 
detailed information about post-Booker sentencing world.  
Several statutory reporting requirements will aid the Commission and Congress 
in the collection of sentencing data to determine the impact of advisory Guidelines.  
Booker did not affect the Feeney Amendment, which requires a judge who prescribes 
a sentence outside of the Guidelines range to explain his reasons in writing “with 
specificity.”241  Also, the reporting requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) remain 
unchanged.242  This statute requires the Chief Judge of every district to submit a 
report to the Commission within thirty days of judgment.243  The report must include 
five specific sentencing documents: (1) the judgment and commitment order, (2) the 
statement of reasons, (3) any plea agreement, (3) the indictment or other charging 
document, and (3) the presentence report.244  Information collected by means of 
statutory reporting requirements will help uncover the problems inherent in advisory 
sentencing.  Only after data has been collected can Congress effectively address the 
weaknesses of advisory sentencing and work to improve and simplify the system.  
Simplified Guidelines will undoubtedly garner support from all actors involved in 
the administration of criminal justice.  
                                                           
 
 
238See ABA Report, supra note 185.  
239Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
240Press Release, United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Chair Comments on High Court Ruling (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov 
/PRESS/rel011305.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
24118 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2004), quoted in ABA Report, supra note 185. 
24228 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2004), noted in Memorandum from Ricardo Hinojosa and Sim 
Lake, to Chief Judges, United States Courts of Appeals; Judges, United States District Courts; 
United State Magistrate Judges; Circuit Court Executives; District Court Executives; Clerks, 
United States Courts of Appeals; Clerks, United States District Courts; Chief Probation 
Officers (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/DIR5-014.PDF (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2005). 
24328 U.S.C. § 994 (2004). 
24428 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2004).  
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2.  A Viable Solution 
Opponents of advisory Guidelines fear that nonbinding Guidelines will create 
unwarranted sentencing disparity in the federal system.245  Appellate review of 
sentences dispels this concern.  Even though Booker altered the appellate review 
standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3742 (e), the criteria of subsections (a), (b), and (f) 
remain unchanged.  A defendant or the government may appeal a sentence and have 
it reviewed for reasonableness.246  Because a sentencing judge must consult the 
Guidelines when imposing a sentence, it seems entirely likely that the Guidelines 
will play a large role in determining reasonableness in the average case.247  In fact, 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office has taken this position.248  Unlike sentencing in the days 
before the Guidelines existed when appellate review rarely occurred, today appellate 
review regularly takes place and serves to control egregious sentencing.  
Compliance rates in states with advisory guidelines further refute the allegation 
that advisory Guidelines will exacerbate sentencing disparity.  According to Carmen 
Hernandez, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,   
“for defendants facing sentences under state advisory guideline systems, 85% of the 
sentences imposed in those systems end up being the sentences that would have been 
imposed under the [G]uidelines.”249  A recent report compared the compliance rates 
of the ten states with advisory guidelines to the compliance rates in states with 
presumptive guidelines. 250  The authors of the report concluded that presumptive 
guideline systems do not produce unwarranted sentencing disparity.251  For example, 
Virginia achieved an 81% compliance rate, while the federal system’s compliance 
                                                                
245See, e.g., Memorandum from James Felman, to the United States Sentencing 
Commission (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04 
/felman.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
24618 U.S.C.S § 3742(e); see also Testimony of Judge Lewis Kaplan, United States 
District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, to Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of 
Representatives (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/files/judge_kaplan_on_booker_nysbalawjournal.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Kaplan Testimony]. 
247Kaplan Testimony, supra note 246. 
248See, e.g., Doug Berman, So, What Is Reasonable?, Sentencing Law and Policy, 
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/01/so_what_is_ 
reas.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
249Adam Liptak, Judges’ New Leeway in Passing Sentence May Change Little, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A14. 
250Kim Hunt and Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. 
SENT. R. 233 (Apr. 2005).  The states with advisory guidelines include Arkansas, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin.  
251Id.  The authors note, however, that no controlled experiment isolating the influence of 
sentencing variables on advisory guidelines has ever been conducted.  The typical research 
design consists of a “before-after” model that focuses on the state enacting advisory 
guidelines.   
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rate in 2002 only reached a mere 65%.252  Virginia’s system has been endorsed as an 
illustrative model of a successful advisory guidelines scheme.253  Thus far, advisory 
guidelines have been operating with success in state systems, and research indicates 
that advisory guidelines do not necessarily produce unwarranted sentencing 
disparity.  Of course, advisory guidelines have the greatest chance for success in a 
single geographic area.  This variable does not, however, preclude success of 
advisory guidelines in the federal system.254            
Statistics released by the United States Sentencing Commission also discredit the 
claim that advisory Guidelines will produce unwarranted sentencing disparity.  As of 
February 4, 2005, the Commission received sentencing documents from 74 of the 94 
federal districts.255  Of the reported cases, 692 contained complete sentencing 
documentation, as required by the Feeney Amendment.256  Among those 692 cases, 
judges sentenced within the relevant Guidelines range 63.9% of the time.  This 
statistic closely mirrors range compliance under mandatory Guidelines, which stood 
around 65%.  Only 7.8% of the post-Booker cases involved sentences below the 
Guidelines range, and only 1.3% involved sentences above the Guidelines range.257  
Overall, the Commission reports that among cases analyzed since Booker, courts 
have sentenced in accord with the Guidelines system as a whole 90% of the time.258  
Although the compiled data is preliminary, it provides evidence that district court 
judges are sentencing pursuant to the Guidelines.  Unwarranted sentencing disparity 
has not inundated the post-Booker advisory sentencing world.  For this reason, 
Congress should allow the advisory Guidelines to remain in place until a future point 
in time when more information has been collected to provide an accurate picture of 
federal sentencing.                       
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines continuously pursue the laudable goal of 
shaping reasonable and fair criminal sentencing in the United States.  Despite this 
commendable objective, the Guidelines remain flawed for the reason that they often 
usurp power from key judicial actors—the judge and the jury.  In United States v. 
Booker, the Court held that mandatory Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment.  To 
effectuate a remedy, the Court transformed the Guidelines into an interim advisory 
sentencing scheme.   
Booker has created an unprecedented opportunity for meaningful reform of a 
deteriorated federal sentencing system.  Although Congress is expected to devise a 
                                                                
252Liptak, supra note 249. 
253Id. 
254Hunt and Connelly, supra note 250. 
255Testimony of Judge Ricardo Hinojosa, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission, to 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House of Representatives (Feb. 
10, 2005), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Hinojosa021005.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2005). 
256Id. 
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new federal sentencing scheme, Congress must first engage in deliberative debate to 
ensure that it adopts a reform proposal that will withstand constitutional challenge.  
Leading reform plans include the Bowman proposal, the Kansas System, and simply 
allowing the Guidelines to continue to function in an advisory capacity. 
Because the precise meaning and impact of Booker remain unclear, advisory 
Guidelines will most suitably address the needs of our criminal justice system.  Only 
as judges interpret and apply Booker will its implications become evident, at which 
point in time Congress can adopt an appropriate long-term reform measure.  To act 
any sooner would be premature.  Congress stands in a place to bring about beneficial 
and necessary reform to an exceedingly complex system.  The reform Congress 
enacts should not only address the Sixth Amendment issue examined in Booker, but 
should also advance policy goals.  Federal sentencing reform based on careful 
examination of sentencing data can create a system with an optimal balance of power 
among the Guidelines, the judge, and the jury. 
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